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Abstract
One of the greatest success stories in our societies is that people are liv-
ing longer, life expectancy at birth being now above 80 years. Whereas the
lengthening of life opens huge opportunities for individuals if extra years
are spent in prosperity and good health, it is however often regarded as a
source of problems for policy-makers. The goal of this paper is to examine
the key policy challenges raised by increasing longevity. For that purpose,
we rst pay attention to the representation of individual preferences, and
to the normative foundations of the economy, and, then, we consider the
challenges raised for the design of the social security system, pension poli-
cies, preventive health policies, the provision of long term care, as well as
for long-run economic growth.
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1 Introduction
One of greatest success stories in our societies is that people are living longer
than ever before. To give an idea, life expectancy at birth is now above 80 years
(average for men and women), having grown by about 12 years since 1950,
thanks to improvements in occupational health, health care, fewer accidents,
and higher standards of living.1
This success in turn presents a huge opportunity for individuals, if extra
years are spent in prosperity and good health.2 Longevity increase is however
often considered more as a source of problems than as a favorable opportunity.
It may indeed have adverse implications on sustainable growth, social security
systems and labor market equilibrium.
The major source of potential di¢ culties lies in the fact that existing in-
stitutions and policies have been built at times where human longevity was
much smaller. Hence, longevity increases may tend to make these obsolete and
inadequate, inviting further changes to t demographic tendencies. Moreover,
institutions and policies may also a¤ect human longevity, and that inuence
needs also to be taken into account in policy debates.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the e¤ects that chang-
ing longevity may have on a number of public policies designed for unchanged
longevity. For that purpose, we propose here to review some recent theoretical
results on optimal public policy under varying longevity. The task is far from
straightforward, since demographic trends do not know the scientic division of
labor between subdisciplines. Increasing longevity raises deep challenges for the
description of economic fundamentals, such as individual preferences and the
social welfare criterion, as well as for the design of optimal public intervention,
both in a static and a dynamic context. As a consequence, the papers and
results that we survey here come from various elds of economics, such as pub-
lic economics and public nance, but, also, behavioral economics, social choice
theory, health economics, growth theory and development economics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents key stylized
facts about longevity increase. It appears that longevity increases over time,
but at the same time remains as variable across individuals as in the past.
Section 3 presents a simple lifecycle model with risky lifetime, and studies the
representation of individual preferences in that context. Normative foundations
are examined in Section 4. It is shown that the traditional utilitarian approach
seems hardly appropriate in case of varying longevity. Then, in Section 5, we
turn to the e¤ects of changing longevity on public policy for health, retirement,
social security, long-term care, as well as long-run economic growth. Section 6
concludes.
1See Lee (2003) on demographic trends around the world over 1700-2000.
2On the measurement of welfare gains due to longevity increases, see Becker et al (2005),
Ponthiere (2008) and Fleurbaey and Gaulier (2009).
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2 Empirical facts
Let us rst have a quick look at the phenomenon at stake: the secular rise
in longevity. As this is well-known among demographers, there exist various
ways to measure longevity outcomes. The most widespread indicator consists
of period life expectancy at birth, that is, the average age at death reached by
a cohort of newborn people, provided each cohort member faces, during his life,
the vector of age-specic probabilities of death prevailing over some period.3
Figure 1 shows the evolution of period life expectancy at birth (for men and
women) around the world, over the period 1947-2009.4
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Figure 1: Period life expectancy at birth (total
population) (years) (1947-2009)
Two important stylized facts appear on Figure 1. First, all countries under
study - with the exception of Russia - have exhibited, during the last 60 years,
a strong rise in life expectancy at birth. Life expectancy has, on average, grown
from about 65 years in 1947 to about 82 years in 2009. Second, even if there
existed signicant inequalities in longevity outcomes across countries in 1947,
those inequalities have tended to vanish over time, except in the case of Russia,
where longevity achievements are today the same as in the early 1960s. For
instance, although Japan started with a life expectancy at birth of about 52
years in 1947, Japan is now at the top of longevity rankings, with an average
life expectancy of 83 years. Hence, there has been a general tendency towards
the lengthening of human life.
3That "period" life expectancy measure, which relies on the currently observed mortality
rates, is to be distinguished from the "cohort" life expectancy, which provides the average age
at death that is actually reached by the members of a given cohort. The latter life expectancy
is far less used, since this requires the death of the whole cohort under study. However, as
shown in Ponthiere (2011a), the di¤erence between the expected average longevity and the
actual average longevity is far from negligible.
4Sources: the Human Mortality Database (2012).
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Naturally, the observed rise in total life expectancy may somewhat hide
inequalities between humans, according to characteristics such as gender, geo-
graphical location, education level, lifestyle, and socio-professional status. Longevity
inequalities across groups within nations may be as large - if not larger - than
longevity inequalities between nations. To illustrate this, Figure 2 shows the
evolution of period life expectancy at birth for men and women in France.5
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Figure 2: Period life expectancy at birth,
men and women (years), France, 1816-2009.
The gender gap between French males and females life expectancy was equal
to only 2 years in 1816 (41 years for women against 39 years for men). That
gender gap has remained, during the 19th century, relatively small and constant,
except at times of social troubles (for instance in years 1870-1871), during which
the gap was signicantly larger, due to the larger involvement of men in conicts.
But during the 20th century, the gender gap will grow continuously: it has
grown from about 5 years in the mid 1930s, to about 6 years in the mid 1950s.
Nowadays, the gender gap is even larger: French women live, on average, about
7 more years than French men (84.5 years for women against 77.7 years for
men). That gender gap within the French economy is much more sizeable than
inequalities in gender-specic longevity achievements between countries.
But even within a particular subpopulation, longevity inequalities may still
be sizeable. Actually, life expectancy statistics provide, by denition, the ex-
pected length of life conditionally on some vector of age-specic mortality rates,
and, thus, focus only on the rst moment of the distribution of longevity in the
population. As such, life expectancy statistics, by focusing on the average, may
tend to hide other moments of the distribution of longevity, such as the variance
(2nd moment), the skewness (3rd moment) or the kurtosis (4rth moment).
In order to have a more complete view of the evolution of survival conditions
over time, it may thus be most helpful to consider also the whole distribution
5Sources: the Human Mortality Database (2012).
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of the age at death, and not only the average longevity. For that purpose,
the most adequate analytical tool consists of the survival curve, which shows
the proportion of a cohort reaching the di¤erent ages of life. Death being an
absorbing state, a survival curve is necessarily decreasing, and its slope reects
the strength of mortality at the age under study.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the period survival curve in France, for
women, between 1816 and 2009.6 When focusing on the left of the graph,
we see that, in comparison to the early 19th century, there has been a strong
reduction of infant mortality.7 The evolution of survival curves allows us also
to measure the changes in the proportion of individuals reaching the old age:
whereas only 31 % of French women could reach the age of 65 in 1816, that
proportion has grown to 40 % in 1900, to 74 % in 1950, and to 92 % today.
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Figure 3: Period survival curves, women, France,
1816-2009.
Moreover, Figure 3 allows us to decompose the observed evolution of the sur-
vival curves in two separate movements. On the one hand, the survival curve
has tended to shift upwards. That phenomenon is known as the rectangular-
ization process: a larger proportion of the cohort can reach high ages of life,
even for a given maximum longevity. The rectangularization of the survival
curve means that an increasingly large proportion of the population dies on an
extremely short age interval. For instance, on the basis of survival conditions
observed in 2009, we can measure that half of the womens cohort will die on
an age interval of about 22 years, between the age of 88 years and the age of
110 years.8 That age interval is much shorter than before, suggesting that there
is a strong concentration of deaths on a shorter and shorter age interval. The
survival curve tends, over time, to become closer and closer to a rectangular,
6Sources: the Human Mortality Database (2012).
7Whereas about 17 % of women born in 1816 could not survive their rst life-year, that
proportion decreased to about 5 % in 1950, and to 0.3 % today.
8On the measurement of rectangularization, see Kannisto (2000).
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which coincides with the extreme case where all individuals would die at the
same age, life becoming riskless.
Besides that rectangularization process, we have also observed another move-
ment of the survival curve. The survival curves has, over time shifted not only
upwards, but, also, to the right. That movement is known as the rise in limit
longevity: some people can, nowadays, reach ages that could hardly have been
reached in the past. That movement can be seen when focusing on the bottom-
right corner of Figure 3. We can see there that the survival curve has tended,
across time, to shift more and more to the right. In 1816, only 0.05 % of women
could become a centenary. In 2009, that proportion is about 3.8 %, that is, 70
times the proportion prevailing in 1816.
Both the rectangularization and the rise in limit longevity explain the ob-
served rise in life expectancy. Note, however, that the relative size of the two
phenomena has varied over time. Whereas the rectangularization process has
dominated the rise in limit longevity until the 1980s, the quasi parallel shift of
the survival curve between 1980 and 2009 reveals that, over that period, there
may have been some derectangularization at work. Thus, even if there has been
a secular tendency towards rectangularization - and an associated reduction of
the variance of the age at death - a derectangularization has recently occurred,
with, as a corollary, some rise in the dispersion of longevity.9
In sum, whereas the evolution of human longevity is often summarized by
the mere rise in life expectancy or average longevity, the dynamics of human
longevity is more complex: a rise in life expectancy may involve either a de-
crease of the risk about the length of life (as under the rectangularization), or,
alternatively, an increase in the risk about the length of life (in case of derec-
tangularization). Moreover, focusing on the changes in the average length of
life in di¤erent countries may also somewhat tend to hide the size of longevity
inequalities within countries, and the evolution of those inequalities over time.
3 A simple model
In order to study the challenges raised by those demographic trends for public
policy, we will, throughout this paper, use a simple two-period model of human
lifecycle. That model is deliberately kept as simple as possible, but has the
virtue to capture all major aspects of life that are central to the study of the
challenges raised by longevity changes.
3.1 Demography
Life is composed of, at most, two periods: the young age (rst period) and the
old age (second period). Whereas all individuals enjoy the rst period, during
which they work, consume and save some resources for their old days, only a
fraction of the population will enjoy the old age. That fraction is denoted by ,
9On the measurement and causes of the rectangularization and the derectnagularization,
see Nusselder and Mackenbach (2000), and Yashin et al (2001).
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with 0 <  < 1. On the basis of the Law of Large Numbers,  can be regarded
both as the probability of survival to the old age, and, also, as the proportion
of the young individuals population who reach the old age, the proportion 1 
dying at the end of the rst period.
Whereas the rst period has a length normalized to 1, the second period has
a length `, with 0 < ` < 1. The motivation for introducing that second demo-
graphic parameter goes as follows. As we saw above, a rise in life expectancy
may correspond to either a fall or a rise in the variance of the age at death,
depending on whether the survival curve shifts more upwards or more to the
right. The introduction of the variable ` allows us to capture this.
Indeed, the life expectancy at birth (LE) is, in our model, equal to:
LE =  (1 + `) + (1  )1 = 1 + ` (1)
Hence, a rise in life expectancy can be caused either by a rise in , meaning
that the proportion of young individuals reaching the old age goes up, or by a
rise in `, implying that old people live longer. In the rst case, the variance of
the age at death (V AR), equal to:
V AR =  (1 + `  (1 + `))2 + (1  ) (1  (1 + `))2
= (1  )`2 (2)
From which it appears that a rise in ` raises the variance of the length of life,
whereas a rise in  only raises the variance of the length of life when  < 1=2,
but reduces it when  > 1=2.
Those two movements of the survival curve are illustrated on Figure 4 below.
The shift from  to 0 pushes the survival curve upwards, whereas the shift from
` to `0 pushes the survival curve to the right.
1
p
p’
1 1+l 1+l ’
Figure 4: shifts of the survival curve in a two-period model.
Naturally, the survival curve shown on Figure 4 is quite di¤erent from the
actual survival curves, shown in the previous section. But it is a simple way
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to capture the various phenomena at work behind the observed rise in life ex-
pectancy. The distinction between a rise in the probability of reaching the old
age and a lengthening of the old age becomes, as we shall see, quite crucial when
public policy is to be based on egalitarian ethical principles.10
Finally, note that the economics of increasing longevity can hardly take 
and ` as mere parameters, but most often regards these as the output of a
health production process. The relationship between longevity outcomes and
their determinants is represented by means of functional forms, which regard
the demographic variable as the output of a production process using particular
inputs. Those inputs can be various, and correspond to longevity determinants
on which individuals have some inuence (e.g. physical e¤ort), or to longevity
determinants on which they have no impact at all (e.g. genetic background).11
For instance, the survival probability  can be regarded as the output of the
following production process, modelized by the survival function  ():
   (e; "; ) (3)
where e denotes the health e¤orts made by the individual, e¤orts that can take
various forms (food diet, physical exercise, etc.), while " denotes the genetic
background of the individual, and  accounts for the degree of knowledge of the
individual ( = 0 corresponding to full myopia, whereas  = 1 coincides with
full knowledge). Similar functional forms can be introduced to account for the
determinants of old age duration `.
3.2 Preferences
Throughout this paper, we will assume, for simplicity, that individual prefer-
ences on di¤erent lives - which are here inherently risky, and, as such, can be
called lotteries of life - can be represented by a function having the expected
utility form. After the work by Allais (1953) on the independence axiom and its
widespread violation, it is clear that this modelling of preferences is a simpli-
cation, but we will, for the sake of simplicity, rely on that simple formulation.12
Temporal welfare is represented a standard temporal utility function u ()
that is increasing and concave in consumption. First-period consumption is
denoted by c, and second-period consumption by d. Note that, given that the
old age may be lived with a much worse health status, it is not uncommon to
rely on state-specic utility function. For instance, for old-age dependency, one
can use, instead of u(), an old-age utility function H (), which is also increasing
and concave in consumption, but with a lower welfare level ceteris paribus, i.e.
u(c) > H(c) for all c level.
Assuming time-additive lifetime welfare, and normalizing the utility of death
10See below.
11See Kaplan et al (1987) on the various determinants of human longevity.
12See Leroux and Ponthiere (2009) for an alternative decision model, based on the moments
of utility approach.
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to zero, the expected welfare of an individual can be written as:
U =  [u(c) + `u (d)] + (1  ) [u(c) + 0]
= u(c) + `u (d) (4)
in case of good health at the old age, or as:
U = u(c) + `H (d) (5)
in case of dependence at the old age.
The above formulation has the obvious advantage of simplicity: the riskiness
and complexity of life is reduced to a two-term sum. However, one may wonder
whether such an analytically convenient representation of individual preferences
capture the key ingredients behind individual decisions. In the recent years,
some strong arguments have been formulated against that formulation. The
assumption of time-additivity of lifetime welfare has been specically questioned
by Bommier in various works (see Bommier 2006, 2007, 2010).
Bommiers attack against the standard modelling of individual preferences
relies on the attitude of individuals towards risk about the length of life. Ac-
cording to Bommier, there exists a serious dissonance between, on the one hand,
the actual attitude of humans in front of risk about the length of life, and, on
the other hand, the predicted attitude from the standard preference modelling.
More precisely, Bommier argues that individuals exhibit, in theory, "net" risk-
neutrality with respect to the length of life - "net" meaning net of pure time
preferences -, dened as the strict indi¤erence of the agent between two lotter-
ies of life with the same, constant consumption per period, and the same life
expectancy. But that kind of risk neutrality is hardly plausible in real life.
It is not di¢ cult to show that the standard modelling of preferences described
above involves risk-neutrality with respect to the length of life. To see this, let
us compare the following two lotteries, which exhibit the same life expectancy,
equal to 1 + 0:5 = 1:5:
lottery A: c = d = c,  = 1 and ` = 1=2.
lottery B: c = d = c,  = 1=2 and ` = 1.
The expected utility under each lottery is exactly the same, and equal to:
u(c) +
1
2
u (c)
But are actual individuals really indi¤erent between, on the one hand, the
certainty to live an old age of length 1=2, and, on the other hand, the lottery
involving a chance of 1=2 to enjoy an old age of length 1? One can have serious
doubts about it: individuals are likely, when being young, to prefer the lottery
A, where they are sure to live a life of length 1:5, and, thus, to escape from
premature death after the young age.
According to Bommier, risk-neutrality with respect to the length of life is
a far too strong postulate, which does not do justice to the actual attitude of
9
humans when facing risky lifetime. Therefore Bommier proposes to get rid of
the time-additive utility function, and to replace it by a concave transform V ()
of the sum of temporal utility. Expected lifetime welfare then becomes:
V [u(c) + `u (d)] + (1  )V [u(c)] (6)
with V 0() > 0 and V 00() < 0.
Back to the two-lottery example, the expected utility of those two lotteries
is now, respectively:
V [u(c)(1:5)]
for lottery A, and
0:5V [2u(c)] + 0:5V [u(c)]
for lottery B.
Given the concavity of V (), the expected utility associated to lottery A is
larger than the one associated to lottery B, in conformity with intuition.
In sum, Bommiers critique of standard time-additive lifetime welfare func-
tion illustrates how the introduction of varying longevity in the picture signi-
cantly a¤ects how one can plausibly model human welfare. That critique is not
a theoretical detail: on the contrary, it plays a signicant role for the under-
standing and rationalization of observed choices (either health-a¤ecting choices
or savings choices), and it has also tremendous consequences for public policy -
in particular when considering redistribution issues - as we shall discuss below.
4 Normative foundations
The extension of human lifespan requires not only a careful modelling of the
lifecycle, but raises also key challenges for the specication of the social objective
to be pursued by governments.13
4.1 Inequality aversion
A rst, important issue concerns the sensitivity of the social objective to the pre-
vailing inequalities. True, that problem is general, and not specic to longevity
inequalities. However, it deserves nonetheless a particular attention, since, as
we shall now see, standard social objectives may lead to quite counterintuitive
redistributive corollaries in the presence of inequalities in human lifespan.
To illustrate this, let us assume that longevity is purely deterministic, and
that there are two types of agents in the population: type-1 agents (who rep-
resent a proportion  of the population) are long-lived, and type-2 agents (who
represent a proportion 1    of the population) are short-lived.14 All agents
have standard, time-additive lifetime welfare. Each agent earns a wage wi in
the rst period, supposed to be equal for the two types of agents: w1 = w2 = w.
13For simplicity, we assume all along that the total population is a continuum with a
measure equal to 1.
14For the sake of simplicity, we assume here ` = 1.
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At the laissez-faire, type-1 agents smooth their consumption over their lifecycle,
whereas type-2 agents consume their whole income in the rst period:
c1 = d1 =
w
2
< c2 = w
There are, in general, large welfare inequalities at the laissez-faire, because of
Gossens First Law (i.e. concavity of temporal welfare). Indeed, under general
conditions identied in Leroux and Ponthiere (2010), the long-lived agent enjoys
a higher lifetime welfare than the short-lived agent: u(w) < 2u
 
w
2

.15 Given
the absence of risk, welfare inequalities are merely due to the Law of Decreasing
Marginal Utility: long-lived agents have, ceteris paribus, a higher capacity to
spread their resources on di¤erent periods, implying a higher lifetime welfare.16
Let us now see how a social planner would allocate those resources. To
discuss this, let us start from a simple resource allocation problem faced by
a classical utilitarian social planner, whose goal, following Bentham (1789), is
to maximize the sum of individual utilities. The Benthamite social planners
problem can be written as:
max
c1;d1;c2
 [u(c1) + u(d1)] + (1  ) [u(c2)]
s.t. c1 + (1  )c2 + d1  2w
The solution is:
u0(c1) = u0(c2) = u0(d1) = 
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint. Sim-
plications yield:
c1 = c2 = d2 =
2
3
w
Classical utilitarianism implies an equalization of consumptions for all life-
periods and all individuals. Hence, long-lived individuals, who benet from an
amount of resources equal to 43w, receive twice more resources than the short-
lived, who only receive 2w3 . Classical utilitarianism thus implies a redistribution
from the short-lived towards the long-lived.
Note that, at the classical utilitarian optimum, the lifetime welfare inequali-
ties between the long-lived and the short-lived are now larger than at the laissez-
faire: instead of an inequality
2u
w
2

  u(w)
we now have, at the utilitarian optimum,
2u

2w
3

  u

2w
3

15This may not be true in a very poor economy when u(w) < 0, and when u(w) > 2u
 
w
2

.
See Leroux and Ponthiere (2010).
16 If, on the contrary, u() was linear, there would be no lifetime welfare inequalities between
the long-lived and the short-lived, since: aw = 2
 
aw
2

.
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which is unambiguously larger. Hence classical utilitarianism implies here a
double penalty of the short-lived: not only are the short-lived penalized by
Nature (as they enjoy, for an equal amount of resources, a lower lifetime welfare
than the long-lived at the laissez-faire), but they also su¤er from a redistribution
towards the long-lived. There is one penalty by Nature, and one by Bentham.
That redistribution from the short-lived towards the long-lived is counterin-
tuitive. The only way to justify it is to say that type-1 agents at the old age are
di¤erent persons than type-1 agents at the young age.17 But that kind of jus-
tication is far from straightforward. Another way to try to escape from that
paradoxical redistribution is to opt for an alternative modelling of individual
preferences, based on Bommier (2006).18 If agentss lifetime welfare takes now
the form of a concave transform V () of the sum of temporal utilities, the laissez-
faire remains the same as above (as here longevity is purely deterministic), but
the Benthamite social optimum is now characterized by the FOCs:
V 0 [u(c1) + u(d1)]u0(c1) = 
V 0 [u(c1) + u(d1)]u0(d1) = 
V 0 [u(c2)]u0(c2) = 
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint.
Given the concavity of V (), we now have:
c1 = d1 < c2
that is, the short-lived has now a higher consumption per period than the long-
lived. Hence, lifetime welfare inequalities are here reduced in comparison to
classical utilitarianism. In some sense, concavifying lifetime welfare is formally
close to shifting from classical towards more inequality-averse utilitarianism, as
suggested, among others, by Atkinson.19
Note, however, that the concavication of lifetime utilities through the trans-
form V () only mitigates the tendency of utilitarianism to redistribute from the
short-lived towards the long-lived, but does not, in general, su¢ ce to reverse the
direction of redistribution.20 An alternative solution is thus needed. One rem-
edy, based on Broomes (2004) attempt to provide a value to the continuation
of life, consists of monetizing the welfare advantage induced by a longer life, and
to count it as a part of the consumption enjoyed by the long-lived. As shown
by Leroux and Ponthiere (2010), that solution is close to the Maximin solution,
that is, a social welfare function à la Atkinson, but with an innite inequality
aversion. Another remedy is the possibility of giving more social weight to the
short-lived individuals relative to the long-lived ones, in such a way that in the
rst-best there would be no transfer from the rst to the second.
17See Part (1984) on di¢ culties to account for a constancy of human identity over a
lifecycle.
18On the redistributive consequences of risk-aversion with respect to the length of life, see
Bommier et al (2011a, 2011b).
19See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), p. 339-340.
20On this, see Leroux and Ponthiere (2010).
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4.2 Responsibility and luck
As shown above, longevity inequalities raise serious challenges to policy-makers
even under standard consequentialist social objectives (like utilitarian social
objectives). But beyond individual outcomes in terms of longevity and con-
sumption, one may argue that a reasonable social objective should also pay
attention to how those outcomes are reached. In our context, this amounts to
examine the reasons why some individuals turn out to be short-lived, whereas
others turn out to be long-lived.
The underlying intuition, as advocated by Fleurbaey (2008), is the follow-
ing.21 True, the idea of responsibility has remained surprisingly absent from
important strands of normative thinking in political philosophy and welfare eco-
nomics. However, as soon as we are living in free societies, where free individuals
make decisions about, for instance, the goods they consume, the activities they
take part in, the job for which they apply, etc., it seems hardly plausible to
leave responsibility issues aside. Responsibility is a necessary consequence of
any substantial amount of freedom. As such, whatever theorists think about
responsibility or not, responsibility is a parcel of any free society.
This is the reason why late 20th century egalitarian theories, such as the
ones advocated by Rawls (1971), Dworkin (1981a, 1981b), or Cohen (1993), are
all, at least to some extent, relying on a distinction between what characteristics
of situations are due to pure luck, and what characteristics are, on the contrary,
due to individual choices, and, as such, involve their responsibility. That dis-
tinction between luck characteristics and responsibility characteristics is crucial
for policy-making. According to Fleurbaey (2008), welfare inequalities due to
luck characteristics are ethically unacceptable, and, as such, invite a compensa-
tion: this is the underlying intuition behind the compensation principle ("same
responsibility characteristics, same welfare"). However, welfare inequalities due
to responsibility characteristics are ethically acceptable, and, thus, governments
should not interfere with the latter type of inequalities: this is the natural reward
principle ("same luck characteristics, no intervention").
The distinction between luck characteristics and responsibility characteris-
tics is most relevant for the study of longevity inequalities. As shown by Chris-
tensen et al (2006), the genetic background of individuals explains between 1/4
and 1/3 of longevity inequalities within a cohort.22 Hence, given that individu-
als do not choose their own genetic background, a signicant part of longevity
inequalities lies outside their control. However, individuals can have also a sig-
nicant inuence on their survival chances, through their lifestyle. As shown
by Kaplan et al (1987) longitudinal study in California, individual longevity
depends on eating behavior, drinking behavior, smoking, sleep patterns and
physical activity.
It follows from all this that longevity is partly a luck characteristic of the
21See Fleurbaey (2008), p. 1-9.
22That study is based on the comparison of longevity outcomes among pairs of monozygotic
twins and pairs of dizygotic twins. The correlation of longevity outcomes is much larger among
the former twins, who share (almost) the same genetic background.
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individual, and partly a responsibility characteristic. That double-origin of
longevity inequalities leads us to a problem that is now well known in the com-
pensation literature (see Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2004): it is impossible, under
general conditions, to provide compensation for a luck characteristic without, at
the same time, reducing inequalities due to responsibility characteristics. Hence,
a choice is to be made between compensation and natural reward.
To illustrate this, consider the simple case where there are two groups of
agents i = 1; 2, whose old-age longevity `i is a function of genes "i and health
e¤orts ei. Those agents di¤er on two aspects. On the one hand, agents of type-
1 have better longevity genes than individuals of type-2. On the other hand,
type-1 individuals have a lower disutility from e¤ort than type-2 individuals. In
that setting, the genetic background is a circumstance or luck characteristics,
whereas the disutility of e¤ort is a responsibility characteristics.23 For simplicity,
the longevity is assumed to be given by:
`i  "i` (ei)
with `0() > 0, and `00() < 0. We assume "1 > "2. The disutility of e¤ort is:
vi (ei)  iv(ei)
with v0() > 0, and v00() > 0. We assume: 1 < 2.
At the laissez-faire, agents solve the problem:24
max
ci;di;ei
u(ci)  iv(ei) + "i` (ei)u(di)
s.t. ci + "i` (ei) di  w
The FOCs yield, for agents of type i = 1; 2:
ci = di
iv
0(ei) = "i`0 (ei) [u(di)  u0(di)di]
Given "1 > "2 and 1 < 2, type-1 agents make, ceteris paribus, more e¤ort
than type-2 agents. If agents had the same genes ("1 = "2), it would still be the
case that type-1 agents make more e¤ort than type-2 agents. Alternatively, if
they all had the same disutility of labour, type-1 agents would still make more
e¤orts (because of better genes).
Comparing their lifetime welfares, we expect that type-1 agents have, thanks
to their better genes and lower disutility of e¤ort, a higher welfare. Are those
welfare inequalities acceptable? Yes, but only partly.
Note that, if all agents had the same disutility of e¤ort (if 1 = 2 = ), type-
1 agents would still get a higher welfare, thanks to their better genes. Hence,
the compensation principle ("same responsibility, same welfare") would require
to redistribute from type-1 towards type-2, to obtain the equality:
u(c1)  v(e1) + "1` (e1)u(d1) = u(c2)  v(e2) + "2` (e2)u(d2)
23We follow Fleurbaey (2008), who treats preferences as responsibility characteristics.
24Here again, we assume that the two agents have the same wage in the rst period, w.
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As "1 > "2, we expect c1 < c

2 and/or d

1 < d

2: some monetary compensation
should thus be given to type-2 agents.
If all agents had equal genes (if "1 = "2 = "), type-1 agents would still be,
thanks to a lower disutility of e¤ort, better o¤ than type-2 agents. But the
principle of natural reward ("equal luck, no intervention") would regard those
inequalities as acceptable, since these are not due to luck:
u(c1 )  1v(e1 ) + "` (e1 )u(d1 ) > u(c2 )  2v(e2 ) + "` (e2 )u(d2 )
The problem is that the need to compensate for inequalities due to luck
characteristics may clash with the non-interference on inequalities due to re-
sponsibility characteristics. To see this, suppose reference disutility  = 1 and
reference genes " = "1.25 Then, the above conditions become:
u(c1)  v(e1) + "` (e1)u(d1) = u(c2)  v(e2) + "2` (e2)u(d2)
u(c1 )  v(e1 ) + "` (e1 )u(d1 ) > u(c2 )  2v(e2 ) + "` (e2 )u(d2 )
We see that those two conditions are, in some cases, incompatible. Indeed, the
LHS of the two conditions are the same. Hence, if "1` (e2 )u(d

2 ) "2` (e2)u(d2) >
2v(e

2 )  1v(e2), we obtain a contradiction. Thus a given allocation may fail
to satisfy both the compensation principle and the natural reward principle.
Such a conict between compensation and reward is not uncommon when
there is no separability between the contributions of e¤ort and luck to individual
payo¤s.26 This is the case in our example, where type-1 agents, who have better
genes than type-2 agents, make also more e¤orts. Hence it is impossible to give
them the reward for their e¤orts, and, at the same time, to compensate type-2
agents, since the latter compensation goes against rewarding e¤orts.
4.3 Ex ante versus ex post equality
In the previous subsections, we deliberately ignored risk, in order to keep our
analysis as simple as possible. However, the risky nature of lifetime raises ad-
ditional di¢ culties regarding the choice of a social objective, as we shall now
see. The problem consists of adopting the perspective that is most relevant for
comparing several distributions of individual outcomes (including longevities).
As stressed by Fleurbaey (2010), there exists a dilemma between two ap-
proaches to normative economics in presence of risk. One can adopt an ex ante
approach, which evaluates the distribution of individual expected outcomes be-
fore the uncertainty about the state of nature is revealed, or, alternatively, an
ex post approach, which evaluates the distribution of individual outcomes that
are actually prevailing after uncertainty has disappeared.
Note that, in some circumstances, there is no opposition between the two
approaches. When a government adopts, as a social objective, average utilitar-
ianism, and when all agents are ex ante perfectly identical, the Law of Large
25The choice of reference levels on all relevant characteristics is not always neutral, but is a
necessary task to be able to discuss compensation and reward concerns.
26See Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2004).
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Numbers guarantees the equivalence between, on the one hand, the allocation
of resources maximizing the ex ante (expected) lifetime welfare of individuals,
and, on the other hand, the allocation maximizing the average lifetime welfare
ex post in the population.27
However, once one adopts a more egalitarian perspective, the ex ante and
an ex post approaches to normative economics are no longer equivalent, and
the associated social optima di¤er strongly. To see this, let us consider a simple
allocation problem, in a context where all individuals, who are ex ante identical,
can turn out to have either a short or a long life.28 Individuals face a life
expectancy 1 + . At the laissez-faire, each agent solves the problem:29
max
c;d
u(c) + u(d)
s.t. c+ d  w
The FOCs imply:
c = d =
w
1 + 
where 11+ is the return of the annuity.
Take now the social planning problem of a planner who has, as an objective,
to maximize the minimum expected lifetime welfare in the population. Given
that all individuals are, ex ante, identical, the solution to that ex ante egalitarian
approach coincides with the laissez-faire.
Compare now that solution with the one of an alternative planning problem:
the maximization of the minimum ex post lifetime welfare. That problem, which
was studied by Fleurbaey et al (2011), can be written as:
max
c;d
minfu(c) + u(d); u(c)g
s.t. c+ d  w
The solution involves several cases. In each case, c denotes the welfare-
neutral consumption level, such that u(c) = 0. Restricting ourselves to the case
where c = 0, we have
c > d = c = 0
The solution of the ex post egalitarian planning problem is very di¤erent from
the one of the ex ante problem. The underlying intuition is that, in order to
minimize welfare inequalities between long-lived and short-lived, one must give
to the surviving old what makes them exactly indi¤erent between further life and
death, that is, the welfare-neutral consumption level c. Any euro left at the old
age beyond that welfare-neutral consumption level prevents the minimization of
welfare inequalities: redistributing it to the young age would raise the welfare
of the short-lived, and, hence, reduce welfare inequalities.
27See Hammond (1981) on that equivalence.
28For simplicity, we assume ` = 1.
29We assume here a perfect annuity market for each class of risk. Its implications for policy
are discussed in the next section (subsection 5.1).
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In the light of this, there exists, in a context of risky longevities, a signicant
discrepancy between what recommends an ex ante egalitarian social objective,
and what recommends an ex post egalitarian social objective. Whereas the for-
mer optimum coincides with the laissez-faire in case of ex ante identical agents,
the latter optimum recommends a serious departure from common sense, by
advocating a lifecycle that makes individuals indi¤erent between living long or
not.30 Whereas that dilemma between ex ante and ex post approaches to nor-
mative economics is very general, and thus not specic at all to the demographic
environment under study, it cannot be overemphasized here that this dilemma
occurs in a particularly acute way in the present context, since inequalities in
life expectancy are very small in comparison to inequalities in actual lifespans.
5 Implications for social policy
5.1 Free-riding on longevity-enhancing e¤ort
Should the government subsidize longevity? At rst glance, that question sounds
more provocative than relevant, as this seems to question something unques-
tionable. There can be no doubt that the large rise in longevity that we are
witnessing is a good thing. Various preferences-based indicators of standards of
living taking longevity into account conrm that intuition.31 It is thus tempting
to conclude that governments should promote longer lives.
There are however some reasons why the government should intervene neg-
atively, and tax longevity, contrary to the common sense. The rst reason is
linked to the annuitization of collective or individual savings when life duration
is uncertain and endogenous. As shown by Davies and Kuhn (1992) and by
Becker and Philipson (1998), individuals do not necessarily take into account,
in their longevity-related choices, the negative e¤ect that these choices can have
on the cost of annuities, and, thus, on the return of their savings. As a conse-
quence, agents may tend to invest too much in their health in comparison with
what would maximize lifetime welfare. This applies to private saving but also
to a Pay-As-You-Go pension scheme. To illustrate that, we take our two period
example with life time utility:
U = u(w      s   e) + (e)u(s(1 + r)=(e) + (1 + n)=(e)) (7)
where r is the market interest rate, 1+r is the return of an actuarilly fair annuity,
and n is the rate of population growth, while  is the payroll tax that nances
the pension of the contemporary retirees having survived. Optimal saving s is
given by:
u0(c) = u0(d)(1 + r) (8)
The choice of health expenditure is given by:
0(e)u(d) = u0(d)(1 + r) + 0(e)u0(d)d (9)
30Similar departures would be obtained in more complete models, with unequal life ex-
pectancies, endogenous labour supply, or endogenous survival depending on e¤ort.
31See Becker el al (2005), Ponthiere (2008) and Fleurbaey and Gaulier (2009).
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The LHS is the benet from an increased survival probability. The rst
term of the RHS gives the direct budgetary cost of health spending. The second
term of the RHS give the depressing e¤ect of longevity enhancing spending
on both private saving and public pension. Individuals do not internalize this
e¤ect in their choice and this calls for a corrective pigouvian tax on health
spending. As shown by Eeckhoudt and Pestieau (2009), this latter expression
can be interpreted in terms of some sort of risk aversion measured by the fear
of ruin.
Finally, note that, while Davies and Kuhn (1992) as well as Becker and
Philipson (1998) cast their analysis in a static setting, some recent papers study
optimal health investment in a dynamic environment. For instance, Pestieau
et al (2008) study the optimal health spending subsidy in an economy with
a Pay-As-You-Go pension system with a xed replacement ratio, and show
that health spending may exceed what is socially optimal, inviting the taxation
of health e¤orts. Another reason for taxing health spending pertains to the
Tragedy of the Commons. As shown by Jouvet et al (2010), given that the
Earth is spatially limited (like a spaceship), ever increasing longevity can also
be a problem, inviting, here again, a pigouvian tax.
5.2 Optimal policy and heterogeneity
When individuals are heterogeneous on longevity-a¤ecting characteristics, there
are other important dimensions a¤ecting the issue of taxing or subsidizing
longevity. To examine that issue, Leroux et al (2011a, 2011b) study an econ-
omy where people di¤er in three aspects: longevity genes, productivity and
myopia. Within that setting, they apply the analytical tools of optimal taxa-
tion theory to the design of the optimal subsidy on preventive behaviors, in an
economy where longevity depends on preventive expenditures, on myopia and
on longevity genes following equation (3).
Public intervention can be here justied on two grounds: corrections for
misperceptions of the survival process and redistribution across both earnings
and genetic dimensions. The optimal subsidy on preventive expenditures is
shown to depend on the combined impacts of misperception and self-selection. It
is generally optimal to subsidize preventive e¤orts to an extent depending on the
degree of individual myopia, on how productivity and genes are correlated, and
on the complementarity of genes and preventive e¤orts in the survival function.
If richer individuals tend to invest more in longevity-enhancing activities, it
can be socially optimal to tax them in a second best setting wherein the social
planner observes neither productivity nor longevity genes.
In other words, the taxation of longevity-enhancing activities can serve as
an indirect way to achieve social welfare maximization in the context of asym-
metric information. Whereas the redistributive e¤ect is ambiguous as to taxing
or subsidizing, the presence of myopia clearly calls for a subsidy. Clearly, if
individuals, because of their ignorance or myopia, do not perceive the deferred
e¤ect that their savings and health care choices may have on their future con-
sumption and their longevity, then such an imperfection of behavior invites some
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governmental correction against individual underinvestment in health.
Note that the design of the optimal policy is even trickier when risk-taking
agents di¤er as to their attitudes towards their past health-related choices. As
discussed in Pestieau and Ponthiere (2012), the consumption of sin goods, such
as alcohol and cigarettes, may lead some individuals - but not all - to regret
their choices later on. Hence, whereas the decentralization of the rst-best
optimum would only interfere with the behaviors that agents will regret ex post,
asymmetric information and redistributive concerns imply interferences not only
with myopic behaviors, but, also, with impatience-based (rational) behaviors.32
Finally, whereas most of the literature on optimal taxation under heterogene-
ity focuses on economies with a xed partition of the population into di¤erent
types, allowing that partition to vary introduces additional taxation motives.
As shown by Ponthiere (2010) in a dynamic model with unequal longevities
due to distinct lifestyles, public intervention may interact with the socialization
process, and, hence, a¤ect the long-run composition of the population. Such
intergenerational composition e¤ects need to be taken into account when con-
sidering the optimal public intervention, as there may exist conicts between
social welfare maximization under a xed composition of the population and
social welfare maximization under a varying composition.
5.3 Retirement and social security
Special pension provisions such as early retirement for workers in hazardous or
arduous jobs are the subject of a great deal of debate in the pension arenas
of many OECD countries. Such provisions are historically rooted in the idea
that people who work in hazardous or arduous jobs say, underground mining
merit special treatment: such type of work increases mortality and reduces
life expectancy, thus reducing the time during which retirement benets can be
enjoyed. This results in such workers being made eligible for earlier access to
pension benets than otherwise available for the majority of workers.
In a recent paper, Pestieau and Racionero (2012) discuss the design of these
special pension schemes. In a world of perfect information, earlier retirement
could be targeted towards workers with lower longevity. If there were a perfect
correlation between occupation and longevity, it would su¢ ce to have specic
pension provisions for each occupation. Unfortunately, things are less simple as
the correlation is far from being perfect. Granting early retirement to an array
of hazardous occupations can be very costly. Government thus prefers to rely on
disability tests before allowing a worker to retire early. Another argument for
not having pension provisions linked to particular occupations is the political
impossibility of cancelling them if these occupations become less hazardous.
To analyze this issue, they adopt a simple setting with two occupations and
two levels of longevity. All individuals have the same productivity but those
with the hazardous occupation face a much higher probability to have a short
32Various theoretical papers examine the optimal taxation of sin goods under time-
inconsistency. See, among others, Gruber and Koszegi (2000, 2001), as well as ODonoghe
and Rabin (2003, 2006).
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life than those who have a secure occupation. The health status that leads to a
high or a low longevity is private information and known to the worker at the
end of the rst period. Before then everyone is healthy.
Individuals are characterized by their health status that leads to either
longevity `S or `L with `S < `L (where L stands for long and S for short)
and by their occupation, 1 for the harsh one and 2 for the safe one. Individuals
retire after z years of work in the second period; they then know their health
status ` that is represented in v(z; `), their disutility for working z years given
that their longevity is `. We assume that v () is strictly convex in z and that
the marginal disutility of prolonging activity decreases with longevity.
The individual utility is given by:
U = u(c) + `u(d)  v(z; `) (10)
with a budget constraint equal to
c+ `d = w(1 + z): (11)
Assuming that there is no saving, the only choice is z that is given by
u0(d)w   v0(z; `) (12)
From this FOC, one obtains that dz=d` > 0 if dv0=d` < 0, which is reasonable.
We have thus 4 types of individuals denoted by kj with k = L; S and j =
1; 2. By denition, the probability of having a long life is higher in occupation
2, than in occupation 1, namely 2 > 1. In a world where 1 = 0 and
2 = 1, the problem of a central planner would be easy. If he maximizes the
sum of individual utilities, the social optimum would be given by the equality
of consumption across individuals and periods and by z1 > z2. In the reality,
however, we do not have those extreme cases; some workers can experience
health problems even in a rather safe occupation and workers can have a long
life even holding a hazardous job. If health status were common knowledge, the
rst best optimum would still be achievable. If it is private information, one has
to resort to second best schemes. Tagging is a possibility. Assume that 1 > 0
and 2 = 1. Then it may be desirable to provide a better treatment to type L1
than to type L2. This is the standard horizontal inequity outcome that tagging
generates. An alternative (or a supplement) to tagging might be disability tests.
If these were error-proof and free, they could lead to the rst best. Otherwise,
a second-best outcome is unavoidable.
In the Pestieau / Racionero approach, the focus is on ex ante welfare. In
Fleurbaey et al (2012) the ex post and the ex ante optimum are compared. It
appears that the age of retirement will be higher in the ex post optimum than
in the ex ante one. The intuition goes as follows. In the ex post approach, the
focus is on the individual who ends up with short life, which leads to low saving,
if any. Those who survive will have to work longer in the second period as they
have less saving than they would have in the ex ante approach.
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5.4 Long term care social insurance
One of the main rationale for social insurance is redistribution. Starting with the
paper of Rochet (1991) the intuition is the following. We have an actuarially
fair private insurance and the possibility of a social insurance scheme to be
developed along an income tax. If there were no tax distortion, the optimal
policy is to redistribute income through income taxation and let individuals
purchase the private insurance that ts their needs. If there is a tax distortion
and if the probability of loss is inversely correlated with earnings, then social
insurance becomes desirable. Given that low-income individuals will benet in
a distortionless way from social insurance more than high-income individuals,
social insurance dominates income taxation. In that reasoning, moral hazard is
assumed away but the argument remains valid with some moral hazard.
While the above proposition applies to a number of lifecycle risks, it does not
apply to risks whose probability is positively correlated to earnings, typically
long term care (LTC). Dependence is known to increase with longevity and
longevity with income. Consequently, the need for LTC is positively correlated
with income, and Rochets argument implies that a LTC social insurance would
not be desirable. This statement does not seem to t reality, where we see the
needs for LTC at the bottom of the income distribution. Where is the problem?
First, we do not live in world where income taxation is optimal. Second, even
if we had an optimal tax policy, it is not clear that everyone would purchase
a LTC insurance. There is quite a lot of evidence that most people understate
the probability and the severity of far distanced dependence.33 This type of
myopia or neglect calls for public action. Finally, private LTC insurance is
far from being actuarially fair; loading costs are high (see Cutler 1993, Brown
and Finkelstein 2004a) and lead even farsighted individuals to keep away from
private insurance: low income individuals will rely on family solidarity or social
assistance and high income individuals on self-insurance.34
Cremer and Pestieau (2011) study the role of social LTC insurance in a
setting, which accounts for the imperfection of income taxation and private
insurance markets. Policy instruments include public provision of LTC as well as
a subsidy on private insurance. The subsidy scheme may be linear or nonlinear.
For the nonlinear part, they look at a society made of three types: poor, middle
class and rich. The rst type is too poor to provide for dependence; the middle
class type purchases private insurance and the high income type is self-insured.
Two crucial questions are then: (1) at what level LTC should be provided
to the poor? (2) Is it desirable to subsidize private LTC for the middle class?
Interestingly, the results are similar under both linear and nonlinear schemes.
First, in both cases, a (marginal) subsidy of private LTC insurance is not de-
33According to Kemper and Murtaugh (1997), a person of age 65 has a 0.43 probability
to enter a nursing home. Nonetheless, as shown by Finkelstein and McGarry (2003), about
50 % of the population with an average age of 79 years reports a subjective probability of
institutionalization within 5 years equal to 0.
34Empirical papers on the origins of the LTC insurance puzzle in the U.S. include Brown
and Finkelstein (2004b) and Brown et al (2006). Courbage and Roudaut (2008) examine that
issue on the basis of SHARE data for France.
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sirable. As a matter of fact, private insurance purchases should typically be
taxed (at least at the margin). Second, the desirability of public provision of
LTC services depends on the way the income tax is restricted. In the linear
case, it may be desirable only if no demogrant (uniform lump-sum transfer) is
available. In the nonlinear case, public provision is desirable when the income
tax is su¢ ciently restricted. Specically, this is the case when the income is
subject only to a proportional payroll tax while the LTC reimbursement policy
can be nonlinear.
5.5 Preventive and curative health care
Consider now an economy where individuals live for two periods: the rst one is
of length one and the second has a length ` that depends on private investment
in health in the second period and on some sinful consumption in the rst period.
It is likely that some people do not perceive well (out of myopia or ignorance)
the impact of their lifestyle on their longevity.
Within this framework, Cremer et al (2012) study the optimal design of
taxation. As expected, sin goods should be taxed, but curative health spending
should not necessarily be subsidized, particularly when there is myopia. They
distinguish between two cases, according to whether or not individuals acknowl-
edge and regret their mistake in the second period of their life. When individuals
acknowledge their mistake at the start of the second period, there is no need to
subsidize health care, but a subsidy on saving is desirable.
To illustrate this, let us consider the problem of an individual who does not
perceive the impact of some sin good x on his longevity. The longevity function
can be written as `(x; e), where  equals 1 for a rational individual, and 0 for
a myopic one, while e denotes the curative health spending. The social planner
- or a rational individual - would maximize:
U = u(c) + u(x) + `(x; e)u(d)
subject to the resource constraint:
c+ x+ e+ `(x; e)d = w
A myopic individual would maximize in the rst period:
U = u(w   s  x) + u(x) + `(0; e)u ((s  e)=`(0; e))
So doing, the individual is likely to save too little or too much. Consuming more
x than it is optimal and expecting to spend less e decreases saving. Expecting
to live longer fosters saving. In the second period, given x, he allocates this
saving between d and e so as to maximize:
`(x; e)u((s  e)=`(x; e))
It can be shown that, to implement the rst-best, the government has to
subsidize saving and tax the sin good. So doing the myopic individual will
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reach the second period with the right amount of sin good and enough saving
to optimally choose both d and e.
Assume now that the individual persist in his mistake and chooses e keeping
ignoring the e¤ect of e¤ort e on longevity. In that case the government has to
subsidize e to reach the rst best allocation. Naturally, with heterogeneity in
both w and , public policy would be more di¢ cult to implement and more
complex to design. Restoring the rst best would then be mission impossible.
5.6 Long-run economic growth
Given that life expectancy determines human life horizon, this is most likely to
inuence decisions a¤ecting economic growth: savings, education, retirement,
and fertility. Growth theorists studied the impact of varying longevity in over-
lapping generations (OLG) models, and assumed either that life expectancy is
exogenous, or that it can be a¤ected by education, health investment or lifestyle.
Those variables being strongly inuenced by governments, that literature is di-
rectly relevant for the long-run public economics of varying longevity.
Starting with the rst approach, Ehrlich and Lui (1991) developed a three-
period OLG model in which human capital is the engine of growth, and where
generations are linked through material and emotional interdependencies within
the family. Agents are both consumers and producers, who invest in their chil-
dren to achieve both old-age support and emotional gratication, and material
support from children is determined through self-enforcing implicit contracts.
Ehrlich and Lui showed that the higher life expectancy is, the higher education
investment in children is, leading to a lower fertility and a higher output per
head. The link between life expectancy, fertility and growth is also studied by
Zhang et al (2001), in an OLG economy with a Pay-As-You-Go pension system.
They showed that the decline in mortality can a¤ect fertility, education, and,
hence, economic growth, positively or negatively, depending on the form of pref-
erences.35 Boucekkine et al (2009) also focused on the relation between fertility
and mortality, but in the context of epidemics, and showed that a rise in adult
mortality has an ambiguous e¤ect on both net and total fertility, while a rise in
child mortality increases total fertility, but leaves net fertility unchanged.
The impact of changes in life expectancy on human capital accumulation
and growth was studied by Boucekkine et al (2002) in a vintage human capital
model, where each generation of workers constitutes a distinct input in the
production process.36 Here again, the impact of a rise in life expectancy on
growth is ambiguous. Three e¤ects are at work. First, a rise in longevity raises
the "quantity" of workers, leading to a higher production. Second, a rise in
longevity favors investment in education, following the Ben Porath e¤ect (see
Ben Porath 1967), inducing also higher production. Third, the fall of mortality
increases the average age of the working population, which may have a negative
35 In a related paper, Zhang and Zhang (2005) show, under a logarithmic utility in leisure
and the number of children, that rising longevity reduces fertility, but raises saving, schooling
time and economic growth at a diminishing rate.
36On longevity and education, see also de la Croix and Licandro (1999).
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e¤ect on productivity and growth. Boucekkine et al (2002) argued that, in a
developing economy, the two positive e¤ects dominate the third, negative e¤ect,
whereas the opposite may prevail in advanced economies.37
The impact of life expectancy on savings and physical capital accumulation
was recently studied by DAlbis and Decreuse (2009), who showed that parental
altruism and life expectancy favor capital accumulation, and compared the as-
sociated intertemporal equilibrium with the innite-horizon Ramsey model. To
evaluate the joint e¤ect of PAYGO pensions and longevity on long-term growth,
Andersen (2005) studied an OLG model with uncertain length of life and endo-
geneous retirement age. The main results is that uncertain longevity implies a
retirement age that is proportional to average longevity and increases the need
to shift from a PAYG system to a fully funded one. The impact of mortality
changes on the retirement decision was also studied by dAlbis et al (2012), who
showed that a mortality decline at an old age leads to a latter retirement age,
whereas a mortality decline at a younger age may lead to earlier retirement.
Turning now to models assuming endogenous longevity, a seminal paper is
Chakraborty (2004), who introduced risky lifetime in a two-period OLG model
with physical capital accumulation, assuming that the survival conditions are
increasing in health expenditures. In that model, high-mortality societies can-
not grow fast, since lower longevity discourages saving and investment such as
education. Regarding long-run dynamics, Chakraborty showed, under a log-
arithmic temporal utility function, and a Cobb-Douglas production function,
that there exists, when the elasticity of output with respect to capital is smaller
than 1/2, a unique and locally stable stationary equilibrium. Chakraborty also
introduced, in a second stage, human capital accumulation through education
in the rst period, and showed that countries di¤ering only in health capital
do not converge to similar living standards. A low-mortality economy always
invests more intensively in skill at a higher rate and thereby augments its health
capital at a faster pace. As a result, it consistently enjoys a higher growth rate
along its saddle-path than economies with higher mortality risks.38
Following Chakraborty (2004), various dynamic models with endogenous
mortality were developed.39 Bhattacharya and Qiao (2005) focused on a two-
period OLG model where both public and private health spending a¤ect life ex-
pectancy. They show that, when those two health spendings are complementary
in the production of survival, the economy is exposed to aggregate endogenous
uctuations and possibly chaos.40 De la Croix and Sommacal (2009) studied the
interplay between medicine investment, scientic knowledge formation and life
37On the link between life expectancy and education, de la Croix et al (2008) showed that
about 20 % of education rise in Sweden (1800-2000) arised thanks to life expectancy growth.
38Following Chakraborty, Finlay (2005) studied how investments in health and in education
compete as ways allowing economies to escape from poverty traps.
39Chakraborty and Das (2005) studied the impact of endogenous mortality on inequalities.
On a more normative side, de la Croix and Ponthiere (2010) examined optimal capital ac-
cumulation in a Chakraborty-type economy. The relation between optimal fertility rate and
optimal survival rate is explored in de la Croix et al (2012).
40Long-run cyclical dynamics is also studied by Ponthiere (2011b) in a model where life
expectancy is a non-monotonic function of consumption, following Fogel (1994).
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expectancy growth in an OLG framework. Ponthiere (2009) examined, in a two-
period OLG model with endogenous  and `, the conditions under which the
rectangularization is followed by a derectangularization of the survival curve.
Chen (2009) studied the relationship between health capital, life expectancy
and economic growth in a two-period OLG model where individuals can invest
in their own health capital, which inuences their life expectancy, and, hence,
economic growth. Finally, Boucekkine and La¤argue (2010) explored the dis-
tributional consequences of epidemics in a three-period OLG economy where
health investments are chosen by altruistic parents, and show that epidemics
can have permanent e¤ects on the size of population and output level.
In the recent years, various models were built to explain the "demographic
transition", i.e. the shift from a regime with high mortality and high fertility
to a regime with low mortality and low fertility. Blackburn and Cipriani (2002)
studied a three-period OLG setting where both mortality and fertility are func-
tions of human capital. They showed that, under standard functional forms for
production and utility, the chosen education is increasing in life expectancy (i.e.
Ben Porath e¤ect), while early fertility is decreasing with it. Several stationary
equilibria exist: one with high fertility and low life expectancy; another one
with low fertility and high life expectancy, as well as an intermediate unstable
equilibrium. Hence, an economy that starts up with poor situation may be des-
tined to remain poor (so called poverty trap), unless there are major exogenous
shocks. Initial conditions matter for demographic transition or stagnation.
Various alternative economic models of the demographic transition have been
developed in the recent years. Galor and Moav (2005) provided an explanation
of the demographic transition that is based on a shift in evolutionary advantage,
from the "short-lived / large fertility" type to the "long-lived / low fertility"
type, which occurred as a consequence of total population growth. The interplay
between education, fertility and longevity is further studied by Cervelatti and
Sunde (2005, 2011) and by de la Croix and Licandro (2012).41
5.7 Miscellenaous issues
Poverty alleviation and health policy Survival chances vary quite a lot
at the old age, according to various characteristics (gender, geographic location,
etc.). One of those characteristics is the income: longevity is, ceteris paribus,
increasing in individual income.42 As argued by Kanbur and Mukherjee (2007),
the positive income / longevity relationship has a quite embarrassing corollary
for the measurement of poverty at the old age. The reason is that, under income-
di¤erentiated mortality, standard poverty measures capture not only the "true"
poverty, but, also, the interferences or noise caused by survival laws. Indeed,
income-di¤erentiated survival laws select proportionally fewer poor persons than
non-poor persons. Hence, poor persons are "missing", in a way similar to the
"missing women" phenomenon studied by Sen (1998).
41Another study of the demographic transition is Yew and Zhang (2011), who show that
social security reduces fertility and raises longevity, capital intensity and output per worker.
42See Deaton and Paxson (1998), Deaton (2003) and Salm (2007).
25
To avoid measurement biases due to the "missing poor", Kanbur and Mukher-
jee (2007) proposed to extend, by means of a ctitious income, the lifetime
income proles of the prematurely dead poor individuals. That solution was
reexamined by Lefebvre et al (2011a, 2011b), who compared adjusted poverty
measures under di¤erent extensions of income proles, on the basis of Belgian
data. Measured poverty is not robust to the treatment of the prematurely dead.
This result has strong consequences for policy-making. As long as public
policy has no inuence on mortality rates, there is no much to say. But as it has
been documented, we know that governments can inuence survival conditions.
Hence, in that case, it cannot avoid a painful choice in case of budget cuts that
can impact the resources of the poor elderly or their rate of mortality. In other
words, putting too much emphasis on reducing poverty in old age can end up
with a policy increasing - rather than reducing - mortality.
Di¤erential longevity and capital income taxation. One of the hot
issues in public nance pertains to the taxation of capital income.43 Opinions
range from the view that there should not be any such tax, given that capital has
already been taxed at an earlier stage, to the view that capital income should
be taxed like any other source of income, essentially wage earnings.
To support the rst view, there is the Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) proposition,
which states that if there exists an optimal income tax, and if leisure and con-
sumption are weakly separable, then capital income should not be taxed. This
is discussed in a setting of asymmetric information wherein both labor supply
and ability are not common knowledge.
When not only productivity but also longevity are private information, the
Atkinson/Stiglitz proposition does not hold. Cremer et al (2010), as well as
Banks and Diamond (2011) show that with these two unobservable individual
characteristics, it is socially desirable to tax capital income if longevity and
productivity are positively correlated. The intuition is simple. The individuals
with long life and high productivity need to save more than the others. Saving
thus becomes a signal of high productivity.
6 Conclusion
Should existing public policies / institutions be adapted to the observed increase
in life expectancy? To what extent does the observed lengthening of life make
existing policies obsolete and inadequate?
The goal of this paper was to survey various recent contributions to those
key policy issues. For that purpose, we started by considering empirical facts,
and noted that the observed rise in life expectancy should not hide the risky
nature of life and the resulting longevity inequalities. Then, we developed a
simple theoretical framework, which helped us to discuss some major challenges
raised by increasing life expectancy. We rst examined the representation of
43On that issue, the seminal paper is Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). Other studies on optimal
capital income taxation include Chamley (1986) and Cremer and Pestieau (2004).
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individual preferences, and underlined the di¢ culty to account for risk-aversion
with respect to the length of life. Then, we considered the choice of a social
welfare criterion, and highlighted the limits of the utilitarian and of the ex ante
approaches, and studied the roles of responsibility and luck. Finally, we studied
the impact of changes in longevity on various public policies: health care, long-
term care, retirement and social security, growth, taxation, and poverty.
Although the present survey does not have the pretension to completeness,
it suggests, nonetheless, that longevity changes invite a deep adaptation of eco-
nomic fundamentals, on both positive side (preferences) and normative side
(social welfare criterion). Given that varying longevity also raises serious policy
issues in terms of pensions, social insurance, health care and long-term care, it
is not exaggerated to conclude that, despite the voluminous literature surveyed
here, a lot of work remains to be done to take longevity seriously, that is, to re-
consider the numerous policy issues discussed here in the light of more adequate
economic fundamentals (individual and social preferences). Longevity changes
will thus remain, for a long time, a key challenge for economists.
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